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DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
~
Rule 24(a)(7)
A statement of the case* The statement shall first
indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A
statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the
record . . . .
~
Rule 24(e)
References in briefs to the record. References
shall be made to the pages of the original record as
paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's
transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f)
or 11(g). References to exhibits shall include exhibit
numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of
which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages
of the transcript at which the evidence was identified,
offered, and received or rejected.
~
Rule 33(b)
Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the
party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wasatch moves to strike the entire Appelleefs Brief.
Appellee's Brief contains references to burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial matters which were not
previously made a part of the trial record.

Under Rule 24(k)

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Practice, briefs which are not
"free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous
matters" may be "stricken or disregarded."

The insertion of

Appendices A, D and I into Appellee's Brief violate

Rule 24(k).

The Court should strike the Appelleefs Brief in

its entirety.
Erickson has implied in his Brief that Wasatch has
acted improperly and misstated facts to the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, and that the Order in Limine was based on
misstatements of fact.

First, this issue was not raised at any

time during the proceedings before the Third District Court,
and cannot now be decided by the Court of Appeals as a matter
of first instance.

Even if the Court of Appeals were to decide

this issue, Wasatch1s position is that Wasatch acted in good
faith throughout the entire proceedings below and also in
bringing this appeal.

It is unclear how Wasatch could possibly

mislead the trial court, or for that matter the Court of
Appeals, when it has supported the statements made in the
memoranda prepared below and in the Brief filed on appeal with
specific references to the depositions of the county employees,
and other relevant portions of the trial record.

If facts had

been misstated to the trial court during Wasatch's Motion in
Limine, it was the obligation of counsel for Erickson to inform
the court of such misstatements at that time, or at least at
some point during the trial proceedings.

Furthermore,

Judge Wilkinson's Ruling on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider the
Order in Limine indicates that he was changing the prior Order
due to the change of testimony of the county employees and not
because of any alleged misstatements.
Wasatch was legitimately surprised by the admission
of the county employees' testimony.

Wasatch had moved for an

Order in Limine excluding their testimony.
-2-

Having obtained

that Order, Wasatch had a right and obligation to rely upon the
Order.

The admission of the testimony of these witnesses

constituted surprise to Wasatch for several reasons:

(1) These

witnesses had changed their prior deposition testimony which
had revealed that they either could not recall the dates of
their prior and subsequent falls or that their falls were
remote in time to that of Erickson's fall; (2) they changed
their prior deposition testimony that they did not report their
falls to anyone at Wasatch Manor; (3) this testimony was
admitted despite the fact that the standards set by the prior
Order in Limine for the admissibility of this testimony had not
been met by Erickson; and (4) Wasatch did not learn that the
witnesses had changed their testimony until the very last day
of trial, just three to four hours before the case was
submitted to the jury for decision.
Wasatch's appeal is based upon two independent and
alternative grounds; first that the trial court erred in
admitting surprise testimony and second that the court further
erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 20. This appeal is well
grounded in fact and warranted by existing law.

Thus, the

appeal is not frivolous and does not warrant a grant of
attorneys fees to Erickson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I;

THE APPELLEE'S BRIEF SHOULD BE STRICKEN, BECAUSE IT
IT CONTAINS IMPROPER REFERENCES TO IMMATERIAL,
IRRELEVANT, BURDENSOME AND PREJUDICIAL MATTERS.
WHICH ARE NOT PART OF THE TRIAL RECORD.
Wasatch moves to strike the Appellee's Brief in its

entirety.

In his extensive, yet largely irrelevant
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Statement of Facts and Summary of Argument, Erickson has
referred to and attached as Appendices two letters from
Erickson1s counsel to counsel for Wasatch.
Brief at pp. 12, 21, Appendices A, and D.

See Appellee's
The Appellee's Brief

also contains the Affidavit of plaintiff-respondent Guy
Erickson.

See Appellee's Brief at p. 49 and Appendix I.

These documents were never made a part of the trial record.

In

fact, Appendices D and I were documents that were generated
during the appeal process.

Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Practice requires that all statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below be supported by citations
to the record.

Furthermore, Rule 24(e) specifies that

references shall be made to the pages of the original record,
or to the pages of the reporter's transcript.

The attachment

of Appendices A, D and I to Appellee's Brief has rendered the
Brief violative of Rules 24(a)(7) and Rule 24(e).
Furthermore, the insertion of the above documents
into Appellee's Brief is a blatant attempt to affect the
outcome of the appeal by improper facts and inferences that
have nothing to do with the legal issues raised by Wasatch's
appeal.

Appendices A, D and I are mere attempts to confuse the

issues and to insert improper and sensitive information into
this appeal.
In particular, Wasatch objects to Appendix I of
Appellee's Brief, which is the Affidavit of Guy Erickson.
First, the Affidavit does not meet the procedural requirements
of an Affidavit, because it contains argumentative statements
rather than facts based upon the affiant's personal knowledge.
-4-

(See para, 3 of Appendix I to Appellee's Brief.)

Secondly,

the Affidavit attempts to generate sympathy, passion and
prejudice against Wasatch by stating that Erickson was
wrongfully evicted, and that he is destitute.

Thus, the

Affidavit attempts to incite the sympathy and passion of the
Court.

It is prejudicial to Wasatch, and taints the entire

brief of Appellee.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that
briefs which are not in compliance with the rules provided
therein may be disregarded or stricken.

Rule 24(k) provides:

All briefs under this Rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged
with proper headings and free from
burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not
in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the
court, and the court may assess attorney
fees against the offending lawyer.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Court of Appeals has applied Rule 24(k) to strike an
entire reply brief in Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah
App. 1989).

In that case, Thomas Maughan had petitioned for

modification of the divorce decree granting custody of his
four-year-old son to the child's mother.

The trial court

denied the Petition for a Modification, and increased Thomas
Maughanfs monthly child support payments.

On appeal, Thomas

Maughan included in his reply brief documents supporting his
argument that he had suffered a loss of income from farming
activities.

770 P.2d at 161, fn. 1.

The respondent,

Mrs. Maughan, moved to strike the supporting documents, because
they were not previously admitted into evidence.

-5

Id.

The

Utah Court of Appeals granted the Motion to Strike, stating
that "all briefs which are not free from irrelevant or
immaterial matter may be 'disregarded or stricken.1"

Id.,

citing R. Utah Ct. App. 24(k).
Erickson1s Brief contains documents which are
"irrelevant" and "immaterial" to the consideration of the
issues on appeal, and contain "scandalous" matters which are
inserted simply to generate sympathy on the part of the Court.
Under the authority of Maughan v. Maughan, and Rule 24(k)
Wasatch Manor respectfully requests the Court to disregard and
strike the Appellee's Brief in its entirety, or at the least,
those portions of the Appellee's Brief which refer to the
above-mentioned documents that have not previously been made
part of the trial record.
POINT II:

THE ORDER IN LIMINE WAS NOT BASED ON
MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT.
For the first time, on appeal, Erickson has argued

that the Order in Limine excluding the testimony of the
three county employees was based on misstatements of fact.
First, it is Wasatch's position that this matter was not raised
by Erickson at any time during the trial court proceedings, and
cannot properly be determined on appeal.

Erickson waived this

issue by failing to raise it during the trial court
proceedings.

He cannot now raise this issue on appeal.

Even if the Court of Appeals was inclined to
determine this issue, the Order in Limine was not based on any
misstatements of fact.

Erickson argues that at the time of

Wasatch's Motion in Limine, counsel for Wasatch misrepresented
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facts in two ways.

First, it is argued that counsel did not

inform the court of Wasatch's defense that Wasatch Manor
employees cleared the snow and ice on the date in question as
they always did pursuant to their habit and routine.
Appellee's Brief at p. 20. Thus, Erickson argues that the
trial court should have been informed of the "routine"
defense.

Wasatch's response to this rather vague argument is

that Wasatch's counsel did not purposely or strategically leave
out any information regarding the "routine" defense in its
arguments to the court.

Furthermore, if Erickson's counsel

believed that counsel for Wasatch was omitting material facts
that were relevant to the trial court's determination of the
Motion in Limine, it was his duty to inform the court of any
such facts.

In fact, Erickson's counsel did point out the

"routine" defense to Judge Wilkinson during oral argument on
the Motion in Limine.

Counsel for Erickson stated to the court:

"The defense has no one who knows anything
about what they did on the day Mr. Erickson
fell. All they can say is that they had a
course of conduct, and that their course of
conduct was to habitually go out at certain
predetermined times every night and sand as
a result of their knowledge of this
dangerous condition . . • the defense is
going to say we salt every time every night
because we are aware of the freeze/thaw
kind of cycle.
(R. 444 at 14). Thus, the trial court was informed of the
"routine" defense, and nevertheless granted the Motion in
Limine.
Erickson further argues that counsel for Wasatch made
misrepresentations or misstatements to the effect that none of
the three county employees fell in the "depressed area" of the
-7-

Wasatch Manor parking lot.

Appelleefs Brief at pp. 20-22.

In

the Memorandum in Support of Wasatch's Motion in Limine,
Wasatch expressly cited to the relevant portions of the county
employees1 depositions, and summarized their testimony
regarding their prior and subsequent falls.

It is unclear how

Wasatch could possibly mislead the court when all of its
arguments and statements of fact were supported by references
to the depositions of the witnesses.
If Erickson believed that
the facts, it was incumbent upon his

?atch was misrepresenting
Dunsel to clarify the

record and notify Judge Wilkinson about any misstatements that
were allegedly made by Wasatchfs counsel.

However, Ericksonfs

counsel did not object to Wasatch's characterization of the
evidence as stated in Wasatch's Memorandum or as stated by
Wasatch's counsel during oral argument on that Motion.

Indeed,

at the time of the oral argument on the Motion in Limine,
Erickson's counsel agreed with Wasatch's statement of facts.
Counsel for Erickson stated to the court:
"Last but not least, I think the Court
has heard a fairly good rendition of the
facts in this case between two counsel.
(R. 444 at 16).
Furthermore, Erickson failed to later challenge the
Order in Limine on the grounds that it was improperly
obtained.

At no time during the trial court proceedings did

Erickson's counsel indicate to the trial court that its Order
in Limine was based on misstatements of fact.

Erickson's

references to ambiguous and innocuous testimony in his Brief on
appeal cannot correct his failure to raise this issue prior to
-8-

this appeal.

The trial court was informed by the two parties

of all the then-existing facts, and accordingly entered its
Ruling granting Wasatch's Motion and excluding the testimony of
the county employees.
POINT III: WASATCH WAS SUBJECTIVELY AND REASONABLY
SURPRISED AT TRIAL.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the ground
rules and guidelines for preparation of a case for trial.
These rules contain provisions for discovery, designation of
witnesses, motions in limine, and pre-trial orders in order to
prevent trial by ambush and generate fair trials for all
parties.

(Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39

(1967)(The purpose of discovery rules are to make discovery as
simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any unnecessary
technicalities, and to remove elements of surprise or trickery
so that the parties and the court can determine the facts and
resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as
possible.)

Wasatch followed these rules of procedure in

deposing the county employees, moving for an order in limine
excluding such testimony, and thereafter relied upon that Order
in preparing its defense.

If Wasatch were not entitled to rely

upon the Order, the Rules of Civil Procedure allowing for broad
discovery, motions in limine, pre-trial orders, etc. would be
superfluous and serve no purpose.
The scope of Judge Wilkinsonfs Order was clear.

The

testimony of the county employees would not be admitted unless
it could be shown that there was a defect in the construction
or design of the Wasatch Manor parking lot, and that the
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witnesses1 prior and subsequent falls occurred within the same
time period and the same area of the parking lot as that of
Erickson1s fall. (R. 443, at 20-23.)

After the trial court

ruled on the Motion in Limine, counsel for Erickson requested a
clarification of the Ruling.

He specifically stated to the

court that he did not intend to introduce evidence showing that
the parking lot was defectively constructed, but he intended to
show that the parking lot presented a dangerous condition
because of Wasatch's negligence.

(R. 444 at 23.)

However,

Judge Wilkinson ruled that Erickson could not compel the
admission of the testimony by showing negligence on the part of
Wasatch.

That exchange was as follows:
Mr. Bjorklund: We do not intend at this
point in time to introduce evidence showing
that it [the parking lot] was defectively
constructed, but that the maintenance of
the parking lot in terms of piling the snow
around the perimeter and the subsequent
salting could—created an on-going
dangerous condition. Now, I understand the
Court's ruling is a dangerous condition
regarding the construction. We are saying,
okay, it's a parking lot that's constructed
the way it is. Their negligence was piling
the snow the way they did all the way
through the winter and failing to salt.
Does that fall within the same kind of
dangerous condition?
The Court: No. I could not allow that of
where you talk of a fall of 15, 10, 15, 18
years ago. There is no way that it can be
tied in that that was plowed the same way
and the same type of conditions existed.
And I would not allow it. Does that clear
it up? Id^
As a result of the Order in Limine, Wasatch did not

expect the testimony of these witnesses to be admitted unless
Erickson called an expert witness at trial to testify regarding
-10-

the defective design or structure of the parking lot.

However,

Erickson failed to proffer any testimony regarding the
construction of the parking lot.

Thus, Wasatch was surprised

that the trial court would reconsider its Order and allow the
testimony into evidence despite the fact that the standards in
the prior Order had not been met.

Wasatch was surprised

because it did not know why the ladies had changed their
testimony, what the new testimony of the witnesses would be,
what questions to ask on cross-examination, and what answers
would be generated by cross-examination of the ladies.
Wasatch was particularly surprised with the ladies1
testimony regarding Wasatch's notice of the alleged dangerous
condition of the parking lot.

At the time of their

depositions, the three county employees testified that they did
not report their falls to Wasatch Manor employees, or could not
recall whether they reported their falls to Wasatch Manor.
438 at 7, 11; R. 439 at 11; R. 441 at 13, 16, 18.)

(R.

During the

oral argument on the Motion in Limine, counsel for Wasatch
indicated to the court his understanding that due to the
testimony of these witnesses, there was no claim being made
that Wasatch had notice of the prior falls. Mr. Hayes stated:
Not one of them, not one of them claim ever
giving notice to Wasatch Manor or its
employees or its manager or anybody that
they had fallen on the parking lot or that
they considered it was dangerous to them.
So that issue of notice, I think, is
agreed. There is no claim in this matter
that these people that he wants to call in
the case claim some kind of notice to
Wasatch Manor . . . . There is no claim in
this case, and if there is, it's news to
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me, that any of these people claim to
have given notice to Wasatch Manor.
(R. 444 at 4-5, 8.)
Counsel for Erickson did not at that time, or at any
time prior to the third day of the trial inform counsel for
Wasatch that a claim for prior notice would be made against
Wasatch.

Ericksonfs Brief admits that Ms. Helms and

Ms. Christensen testified in their depositions that they had
not reported their falls to Wasatch Manor.
at p. 26.)

(Appellee's Brief

Erickson1s attempt to distinguish between "report"

and "communicate" fails, because that is a distinction without
a difference.
A further element of the surprise experienced by
Wasatch is that Wasatch did not know until the very last day of
trial that there was a change in testimony.

On the other hand,

evidence indicates, and Erickson admits, that counsel for
Erickson knew as far back as three weeks prior to the trial
that there might be a change in testimony.
Appellee's Brief at p. 27.)

(R. 446 at 77;

Nevertheless, Erickson's counsel

failed to inform the court or counsel for Wasatch of this new
information.

Erickson claims that his counsel had no

obligation to be "clairvoyant," and to conduct discovery on
behalf of Wasatch.

Erickson fails to recognize his counsel's

obligation as an officer of the court to supplement discovery
and to prevent surprise, trickery, or trial by ambush.
Furthermore, Wasatch's counsel had properly conducted
its discovery.

There was no obligation, and certainly no

reason, for Wasatch's counsel to continue questioning the
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county employees where the Order in Limine specifically
excluded their testimony.

Certainly, if Erickson had

designated someone who would testify regarding the alleged
defective construction of the parking lot, it would have been
necessary for Wasatch to depose and question that witness in
order to prepare its defense.

That particular situation was

within the realm of the Order in Limine.

However, in light of

the Order, there was no logical reason to further question the
county employees.
POINT IV;

ERICKSON'S CONDUCT RESULTED IN TRIAL BY AMBUSH.
The surprise suffered by Wasatch occurred during

the three weeks after Ericksonfs counsel learned of the
change in testimony, yet failed to inform Wasatch of this
development.

The only reason that one can possibly imagine for

this failure to inform Wasatch is that Erickson and/or his
counsel were attempting to conduct this trial by ambush.
Erickson argues in his Brief that Wasatch's alleged
misstatements and omissions forced Erickson to wait until the
last day of trial to request the court to reconsider the Order
in Limine.

Even if Erickson was correct in his argument that

the Order was based on misstatements and omissions, Erickson
still had a duty to supplement discovery and inform Wasatch of
the new testimony, and Erickson had the opportunity to
challenge the propriety of the Order during the three weeks
prior to the trial after he learned of the change in testimony.
Rather, what seems to have happened is that counsel
for Erickson knew that the ladies would change their testimony

-13-

even at the time of oral argument on the Motion in Limine. At
that time, counsel for Erickson, Mr. Bjorklund, stated to the
court:
The ladies, when they were called to these
depositions had not talked to me at all. I
had not prepared them. I had not asked
them to go to their diaries. I had not
asked them to talk to their friends or do
anything else that they might otherwise do
to refresh their recollection. They came
into those depositions absolutely cold.
(R. 444 at 16.)

Suspecting that Mr. Bjorklund was not

revealing all that he knew, counsel for Wasatch, Mr. Hayes,
demanded that any new information be divulged.

Mr. Hayes

stated:
Now, if I am getting the suspicion that he
expects these women to testify differently
than they did in their deposition, if
that's the case, he should have come here
armed today with affidavits to say so, to
ask the Court to do it on the come, so to
speak, and wait and see what happens. I
don't think it is fair to the Court, and
it's not fair to me to say that these women
are going to testify differently and put it
all in a period of '84/'85. Because they
clearly did not do that in their
depositions.
* * * * * *

If counsel intends to put on or thinks that
there is going to be evidence that's
sufficient to lay a proper foundation, I
think he is obligated at this point to make
a record of it and tell us what that is
going to be, and make some kind of
proffer. Otherwise, I don't think he can
argue that it's going to come and counsel
should be ready when he hears it to try
to cross-examine the witnesses with.
(R. 444 at 17-19.)
Counsel for Erickson did not at that time, or at any
time prior to the trial, make the proffer demanded by Wasatch.
-14-

On the third day of trial, however, Erickson moved the court to
reconsider the Order in Limine, claiming that the witnesses had
changed their testimony, because they had, in fact, consulted
their diaries, journals, calendars, and friends.

Judge

Wilkinson specifically relied on this changed testimony in
reaching his decision to reverse his prior Order in Limine and
admit the testimony of the three county employees.

The judge

expressly stated that he would have to admit the testimony,
because the witnesses had brought their falls within the same
relative time period as the fall of Erickson.
55-56.)

(R. 446 at

Had Erickson made his Motion three weeks prior to the

trial when he obtained the new information, or at any time
during the three weeks prior to trial, Judge Wilkinson could
have changed his Order, but at least Wasatch would have had
time to prepare for the new evidence.
POINT V;

THE TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES WAS NOT
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.
Rebuttal evidence is properly deemed to be evidence

which is relevant only by virtue of evidence deduced by the
adverse party.

Its function is to explain or rebut the

evidence introduced by the adverse party —
support the parties1 case-in-chief.

not mainly to

Wells v. C M . Mays Lumber

Co.f Inc., 754 P.2d 888, 889 (Okla. App. 1987).

Rebuttal

witnesses are those persons the necessity of whose testimony
reasonably cannot be anticipated before the time of trial.
Wirth v. Commercial Lease Resources, Inc., 96 N.M. 340, 630
P.2d 292, 298 (1981).

The party who has the affirmative burden

of proof is required to produce the first evidence on an issue,
-15-

and at that time should produce'all his evidence in chief.
Then, after his adversary has produced all his evidence, the
former should be confined to rebuttal evidence, or evidence
which tends to answer or explain his adversary's evidence.
Soliz v. Ammerman, 16 Utah 2d 11, 395 P.2d 25, 26 (1964).
In Wells, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that
the admission of a tape-recorded conversation between the
appellants was not admissible as rebuttal evidence.

In that

case, Wells contracted with Richardson to act as a foreman and
supervise the construction of Well's home.

Wells later brought

an action against Richardson and the company from whom
Richardson obtained the building materials, alleging that the
defendants were improperly overcharging Wells for the
materials.

754 P.2d at 889.

On the final day of trial, after

the defense had rested, the trial court allowed Wells to reopen
the case and present as rebuttal evidence a tape-recorded
conversation between Wells and an employee of the defendant in
which the employee admitted his guilt.

Id.

The

tape-recording was not listed on the pre-trial order as an
exhibit.

Wells claimed that this was due to the fact that he

was either unaware of it or had forgotten about it.
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that the
tape-recording should have properly been offered as evidence as
part of Well's case-in-chief, rather than as rebuttal evidence,
because it obviously went to the major premise of Well's
argument.

Id.

The court held that regardless of whether

Wells knew of the tape-recording prior to the last day of
trial, he should have known about it.
-16-

The court further held:

Presentation of the tape on the last day of
trial without Defendant's prior knowledge
that such tape existed was not only
violative of pre-trial discovery
requirements, but it also constituted
harmful surprise and was clearly
unfairly prejudicial to Defendant's case.
754 P.2d at 890.
Similarly in Wirth, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
held that the testimony of a witness not previously included in
the pre-trial order did not constitute "rebuttal" testimony.
Because the witness1 testimony was intended to discredit the
plaintiff's credibility, the New Mexico court held that the
testimony was part of the planned case of the defense, and it
was not rebuttal testimony which was reasonably unanticipated
prior to the time of trial.

630 P.2d at 298.

In the present case, the testimony of the county
employees was not true rebuttal testimony.

First, the

testimony of these ladies was offered by Erickson during his
case-in-chief.

At that time, Wasatch had not even begun to

present its defense.

Although Erickson called as adverse

witnesses two employees of Wasatch, Wasatch's counsel did not
question these witnesses until after the testimony of
Ms. Helms, Ms. Christensen, and Ms. Mark was presented to the
jury.

Thus, the testimony of these ladies was not introduced

to rebut the evidence presented by Wasatch.

Furthermore, the

testimony was reasonably anticipated prior to the time of
trial.

In fact, the ladies' testimony, like that of the

witness in Wirth, was intended to discredit the credibility
of Wasatch's witnesses.

Thus, this testimony was a part of
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Ericksonfs planned prosecution or case-in-chief, and was not
rebuttal testimony.
It would be against policy considerations to allow
this testimony to come in as rebuttal testimony when Wasatch
has previously relied upon the court's Order that the testimony
would not be admissible unless the guidelines established in
the Order were met.

To allow this to occur in this case would

be in total contradiction to the purposes of the rules of civil
procedure and an abuse of discretion.
The trial court did not indicate at any time during
its Ruling on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider the Order in
Limine state that he would admit the testimony on the grounds
that it constituted rebuttal testimony.

Rather, the court

indicated that its decision to admit the testimony was based on
the change in testimony.
POINT VI:

(R. 446 at 56.)

THE TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY EMPLOYEES AFFECTED
THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL.
Erickson has argued in his Brief that the testimony

of the county employees did not change the outcome of the
trial.

At this point it is pure speculation how this testimony

affected the jury at arriving at its verdict.

However, had the

courts original Order in Limine been enforced, there would
have been no witnesses to testify regarding the alleged prior
slip and fall accidents on the Wasatch Manor parking lot, and
there would have been no one to testify that Wasatch Manor had
prior notice that people had fallen on the parking lot and/or
that the lot was dangerous.

However, at trial, they not only

testified that they reported their falls, but further
-18-

identified Art Kersey as the Wasatch Manor employee to whom
they reported their falls.

(R. 446 at 63-63, 89.)

POINT VII: WASATCH SUFFICIENTLY OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSION
OF THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY AND PROPERLY PRESERVED
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ITS ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE.
In April 1989, Judge Wilkinson heard oral argument
on Wasatch1s Motion in Limine, requesting that the testimony
of three county employees be declared inadmissible.
dated May 10, 1989, the court granted this Motion.

By Order
The case

proceeded to trial, and the admissibility of the testimony was
again raised, this time by Erickson's Motion for
Reconsideration.

Wasatch accordingly objected to the admission

of this testimony in oral argument on the Motion to
Reconsider.

Thus, Wasatch objected at trial in accordance with

Utah law, and preserved its right to challenge the Court's
admission of the surprise testimony.
That Wasatch properly preserved its right to
challenge the admission evidence is supported by Utah Rules of
Evidence 103(a)(1).

Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a)(1) states:

Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected,
and
(1) in case the ruling is one
admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record,
stating the specific ground of objection,
if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Wasatch's objection was timely in that it was raised as soon as
Erickson moved for reconsideration of the Court's Order.
The rationale for the rule that objections regarding
admission of evidence must be raised at trial was outlined in
-19-

State v, Lesley. 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).

The Utah Supreme

Court stated:
Prior to trial, a judge is often in a
disadvantaged position to decide on the
admissibility of evidence. The trial judge
is likely to have a more complete view of
the grounds for excluding or admitting
certain evidence. When defense counsel
fails to call the trial judge's attention
to any problems regarding the admissibility
of evidence at the time it is offered, he
or she deprives the trial court of an
opportunity to avoid error in the trial
which may nave been created by an improper
ruling on a pre-trial motion based on
inadequate information. (Emphasis added.)
672 P.2d at 82. The court further stated:
The only requirement is that any
objections to evidence be made known to
the trial judge so that he or she can make
an informed decision to admit or exclude
it. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 82 n. 1.
In the trial of this matter, Mr. Hayes, counsel for
Wasatch, complied with the holdings of State v. Lesley and
State v. Holyoak, 743 P.2d 791 (Utah App. 1987).

Mr. Hayes

made his objection to the testimony of the three county
employees "known to the trial judge."

Unlike the facts

presented in State v. Lesley and State v. Holyoak, Wasatch
does not simply rely on its pre-trial Motion in Limine in
arguing that it properly objected to the admission of
testimony.

Rather, Wasatch points out that on the third day of

trial, in oral argument on Erickson's Motion to reconsider,
Mr. Hayes objected to the admission of such testimony based on
surprise.

Thus Mr. Hayes1 objection was made at trial, and

before the trial judge.

Mr. Hayes1 objection brought to
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Judge Wilkinson's attention the problems associated with
admitting such testimony into evidence.
the opportunity to avoid error*

The trial court had

According to State v.

Lesley, the purposes of Utah Rules of Evidence 103(a)(1) have
been met.
POINT VIII:

THE TRIAL COURT1 ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING WASATCH S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Wasatch appealed on the grounds that the court erred
in admitting surprise testimony/ and in giving Jury
Instruction No. 20.

These are alternative and independent

grounds for the appeal.

However, their effect is cumulative in

that they both resulted in prejudice to Wasatch.

As more fully

briefed in Point III of the Corrected Appellants Brief, it is
Wasatch's opinion that the trial court "transgressed any
reasonable bounds of discretion" in denying Wasatch's Motion
for a New Trial.

See Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201

(Utah 1981); Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134,
427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967).

The trial court abused its

discretion in failing to order a new trial to Wasatch who was
genuinely and severely surprised when the trial court, on the
very last day of trial, reversed its own prior Order in Limine,
thereby allowing into evidence crucial testimony against
Wasatch for which Wasatch had no opportunity to prepare.
The trial court further abused its discretion by
giving Jury Instruction No. 20 which misstated the standard of
care that a landlord must exercise toward a tenant.

As more

fully briefed in Point II of the Corrected Appellant's Brief,
Utah law does not impose upon the landlord any duty beyond that
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of the exercise of ordinary care to maintain its premises in a
reasonably safe condition for its tenants and guests.
Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah
App. 1988); Schofield v. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427 511 P.2d
149, 151 (1973).

The law does not impose on the landlord a

"further duty" to observe dangerous conditions known to him, or
which reasonable diligence would reveal, and to take reasonable
steps to remedy or remove those dangerous conditions.

However,

this "further duty" was improperly included in Jury Instruction
No. 20.
Contrary to Erickson's accusations, Wasatch did not
intend to mislead the Court of Appeals that Jury Instruction
No. 20 merely contained objectional language.

In fact,

Wasatch's Brief cited what it considered to be the
objectionable part of Jury Instruction No. 20, and attached the
entire Jury Instruction as Appendix C to its Brief.

(See

also Corrected Appellant's Brief at p. 31.)
The Cornwell v. Barton, 18 Utah 2d 325, 422 P.2d
663 (1967) case relied upon by Erickson did in fact approve of
an instruction such as the portions of Instruction No. 20 to
which Wasatch objects.

Although that case has not been

overturned, the more recent cases on landlord tenant liability
do not impose any "additional duties."

It is Wasatch's

position that these recent cases, such as Gregory v.
Fourthwest Investments, and Schofield, established the
proper standard of care to be applied to a landlord.
In the most recent case on the standard to be applied
to a landlord, Gregory v. Fourthwest, the Utah Court of
-22-

Appeals cited Martin v Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139
(Utah 1977) with approval.

As previously briefed, Martin v.

Safeway Stores rejected an instruction like that of
Instruction No. 20 in this case, and held that it is not the
duty of persons in control of buildings to mop the sidewalks
dry or to take other steps necessary to prevent the
accumulation of moisture on the sidewalk, and they do not have
a duty to seek out and mop dry all such depressions in the
walkways.

565 P.2d at 1140-41.
Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given.

The

fact that the trial court instructed the jury as to the proper
standard of care required of a landlord after it had given
the incorrect standard of care does not cure the improper
instruction, nor does it render the instruction proper and
non-objectionable.

It is likely that in its absence, a

reasonable jury would find that Wasatch had met its standard of
care under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This appeal was properly brought by Wasatch.

The law

does not support a grant of attorneyfs fees in this case.
The standard in determining whether a party has brought a
frivolous appeal is set out in Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

That rule states that a frivolous appeal

is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or
reverse the existing law.

See also O'Brien v. Rush, 744

P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987).

However, sanctions for

frivolous appeals should only be applied in "egregious cases,
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lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal
erroneous lower court decisions,"

Porco v. Porco# 752 P. 2d

365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).
Erickson's suggestion that the appeal is frivolous is
nothing but ludicrous hype.
the appeal is not frivolous.

As obviously shown in two briefs,
Wasatch not only has a legitimate

right but obligation under the law to appeal the admission of
surprise testimony, particularly where the surprise was due to
the trial court's sudden reversal of its own Order upon which
Wasatch relied.

Furthermore, Wasatch's appeal regarding Jury

Instruction No. 20 is supported by case law indicating that the
instruction was not a proper statement of the law.
For the foregoing reasons Wasatch respectfully
requests the Court to reverse the trial court's Judgment, or in
the alternative, remand this case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of July, 1990.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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MASUDA A. MEDCALF
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Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Wasatch Manor, Inc.
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